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Persistence of Price-Cost Margins in the U.S. Food and Tobacco
Manufacturing Industries: A  Dynamic  Single  Index  Model
Approach
J. A. L. Cranfield
Persistence of price-cost margins in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing  industries is measured while accounting
for price-cost margin  risk.  Direct  measurement  of persistence  and of long-  and short-run  price-cost margin risk  is
accomplished  by  incorporating  a  partial-adjustment  framework  into  the  Single  Index  Model.  Results  indicate
persistence  of price-cost  margins.  Short-run  margin risk is  accounted  for primarily  by diversifiable  risk. Long-run
margin risk, which depends on systematic risk alone, is generally lower than the short-run measure. Factors influencing
persistence  and the systematic relationship between industry margins  and a market index are explored.
The  Pareto  optimality of a  neoclassical  competi-
tive equilibrium has long been used as justification
for antitrust enforcement  in the United States  and
competition  policy in Canada and Europe.  In fact,
antitrust enforcement and competition policies typi-
cally use the long-run  level of equilibrium profits
as a measure of Pareto optimality.  A market is said
to be  competitive  in the neoclassical  sense  if the
long-run level of economic profit is zero. In such a
case, market discipline serves to temper an agent's
ability to affect price via free entry and exit. While
it has  long been recognized  that the assumptions
needed to utilize the neoclassical model are limit-
ing,  attempts  have been  made  to  model  industry
performance while relaxing these assumptions. One
area  receiving  modest  attention  is  the  incorpora-
tion of risk.  Geroski  and  Jacquemin  (1988)  pro-
vide  an  example from  the  industrial  organization
literature; they measured profit-rate risk using the
variance of the error term in a model of profit-rate
persistence.  Others have measured profit rate risk
using alternative measures such as the variance of
an asset's return or the covariance  of an asset's re-
turn with a portfolio return (e.g., Neumann, Bodel,
and Haid  1979; Harris  1986; Mueller  1986).
While the  cited  studies  are  important  in  the
analysis of firm-level  returns,  one must not over-
look  the persistence  of industry-level  price-cost
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margins  and the variability of such margins  rela-
tive to a measure of broadly defined market-based
risk.  For instance,  the persistence  of price-cost
margins  in  an industry  may come  about  through
non-competitive  entry barriers or from variability
in the price-cost margins, making entry less attrac-
tive to potential  entrants  and thereby allowing ex-
isting firms  to  maintain  high price-cost  margins.
Two  points  must be  recognized  here.  First, non-
competitive  market  environments  do  not  arise
through serendipity; actions taken by decision mak-
ers in the food-processing  sector can have a direct
bearing on the level of return, the risk-return rela-
tionship,  and  the  degree  of risk within  a  sector.
Second, recognizing that price-cost margins exhibit
a risk-return  type of trade-off provides  antitrust
officials with a tool that further enables better dif-
ferentiation between industries that ought to be in-
vestigated  (i.e.,  high  average  margins  with low
margin variability) and those that should not be tar-
geted (i.e., high average margins with high margin
variability).  Presumably such a tool will allow for
better  allocation  of resources  in the  enforcement
of antitrust and competition policy.
The  objective  of this  paper is to measure  the
persistence of price-cost  margins in the U.S. food
and  tobacco  manufacturing  industries  while  ac-
counting for the role of price-cost margin risk (i.e.,
variability).  To  achieve  this objective,  the  Single
Index Model (SIM) (see Sharpe 1963; Lintner 1965)
is modified using a partial-adjustment  framework.
The resulting dynamic model allows for a charac-
terization  of industries  according  to  the variance
and persistence of price-cost margins. The SIM ap-
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nature of risk in  agricultural  production  (Collins
and Barry  1986; Turvey and Driver 1987; Turvey,
Driver,  and  Baker  1988;  McKillop  1989;  Blank
1990,  1991).  However,  it has not been used in the
context of evaluating  the nature of the risk-return
trade-off in the U.S. food and tobacco manufactur-
ing industries.  Furthermore,  use of the partial-ad-
justment framework allows for a short- and  long-
run  differentiation  in  the systematic  relationship
between  an  industry's  price-cost  margin  and  a
broader  sectoral  price-cost  margin.  Others  have
modified the SIM to allow for similar intertemporal
variation (Fabozzi and Francis  1978; Sunder 1980;
Bos and Newbold  1984) using random coefficients
or time-varying  coefficients.  In so doing, past re-
search efforts have developed models wherein risk
measures  also vary  over time.  This paper,  there-
fore,  contributes to the literature by using the par-
tial-adjustment model to allow for a distinction be-
tween  short-  and  long-run measures  of risk,  thus
providing  another means to temporally  differenti-
ate risk measures.
In the next section, the SIM is modified to re-
flect partial adjustment of price-cost margins. Data
used in the analysis are then discussed. Results are
presented  and discussed  with a focus  on the sys-
tematic and nonsystematic risk breakdown,  delin-
eation between short- and long-run risk character-
istics,  and persistence of returns. Industry charac-
teristics are then used to explain estimates from the
SIM, followed by a concluding section.
A Dynamic  Single  Index  Model  Using  Partial
Adjustment
The Single Index Model (SIM), from Sharpe (1963)
and Lintner (1965), can be used to capture the rela-
tionship between the return to an individual asset
and the return to a market index (i.e., stock market
index).  This relationship  is typically expressed  as
a linear function with an error term:
(1)  ri  =  'i 
" + 
' irmnt + eit
where  rit is the return to the  ith asset in period  t,
i=1,..., n indexes the assets, t=1,..., Tis a time in-
dex, y, and 56  are unknown parameters,  rnt is an in-
dex  representing returns to a market,  and eit is  an
error term associated with the ith asset's equation
in period t. Following convention when estimating
a SIM, the return to the ith asset is assumed to be
independent of the return to thejth asset, for all icj.
The estimated value of 6i, which measures the ex-
pected  relationship  between  the ith  asset and the
index, is referred to as the beta coefficient.
Traditionally, et is assumed to be independently
and identically distributed Normal, with mean zero
and  variance  2i..  Once  equation  (1)  is estimated,
the variance for the  ith asset can be expressed  as
a
2 =  62 G2  + 
2
i,  where o2is the risk associated with i  m  et'  i
the ith asset,  a2 is variance of the market return,
62(
2 is referred  to  as  systematic  risk, and  o2 . as
nonsystematic  risk. Systematic risk represents  risk
that cannot be diversified, while nonsystematic risk
can be eliminated through diversification.
Realize,  however,  that returns  to an asset  do
not necessarily adjust instantaneously  to a change
in  the market  return.  Market  frictions  generated
through  imperfect  information,  switching  costs,
transactions  costs, and regulations by government
and non-government  institutions can slow the ad-
justment of rt  to a change in rmt. Given this, it would
become apparent that the SIM expressed in (1)  ig-
nores the potential for the dynamic behavior of re-
turns generated through partial adjustment to shocks
in  rmt.  In  this paper,  dynamics  are introduced  by
assuming that the return to an asset follows a par-
tial-adjustment  process.  In the partial-adjustment
framework,  returns  do not adjust instantaneously
to an exogenous shock. Rather, adjustment occurs
over multiple periods and is governed by the equa-
tion (see Kmenta  1986, 529-30)
(2)  rt - rit,  = (I - x  ri - ri,,)+  et
where ye (0,1) is an unknown parameter that mea-
sures the rate of adjustment of r, to ri, the long-run
(i.e.,  steady-state) return to the ith asset. Here, the
long-run return to the ith asset is expressed as
(3)  ri  a,  + birmt
where a. and b. are coefficients  of the SIM when in
long-run equilibrium and reflect the relationship be-
tween rt and rmt when adjustment in rt is complete.
Equation 3 says that the long-run return to the ith as-
set is a linear function of the return to the market.1
' Note that if one took the expectations operator through
equation (1), it would become clear that g, and a, are equivalent,
as are di  and b,.  Thus, equations (1) and (3) are  equivalent in
expectation.
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Since  ri  is not  observable,  one  cannot  estimate
equation (3). However,  substituting (3)  into (2) re-
sults in
(4)  rt  - rit_, =  - (1-  Xai + birmt - ri )+ eit
which can be simplified to
(5)  rit = q'i + Pirmt +  iril  + eit  .
Since equation (5) represents the process by which
rit adjusts  to a change in the market return, it is a
short-run version of the  SIM, where  a, and  b, are
the unknown short-run parameters of the SIM. All
of the  returns  shown  in (5)  can be  observed and
used to estimate  the underlying parameters of the
adjustment process (equation 2) and long-run rela-
tionship  between  the  ith  asset and market  return
(equation  3).  Specifically,  once  ai, b,, and  Xi  are
known, estimates of a, and b. can be calculated us-
ing the fact that ac  = (1-k)ai  and i  = (1-X.)b.  Thus
use of the partial-adjustment  model also allows for
a differentiation between the short-run beta coeffi-
cient (,i) and the long-run beta coefficient (b). Fi-
nally, since Xi measures the rate of adjustment of r,
to r*,  it is interpreted  as a measure of the persis-
tence of returns to the ith asset. The larger (smaller)
the value  of X i, the  more  (less) persistent the re-
turn.
The variance  of the ith asset can now be com-
puted in two ways.  In the first case,  the  variance
operator is taken through (5)  to yield 02 = Po2m +
X2 o  +  2, which can be stated as
i
( 6 )
2
-'2  p  2  - ei (6)  2  O
For reasons  that will  soon become  apparent,  this
last expression is referred to as the transitional  (i.e.,
short-run) variance  of the ith asset. The first term
on the right-hand  side of (6)  is short-run  system-
atic  risk,  while  the  last  term  is  short-run
nonsystematic  risk.  The second  way to calculate
risk is to note that in the long-run returns are such
that rit= rit, = rt,  which reflects  full and complete
adjustment. As such, equation (4) can be expressed
as
(7)  0 = ri  - rit, = a,  + 3irmt + (  -i  - 1,it_
Notice that the error term has been omitted in equa-
tion  (7). This is because when  rit = rt- = r  equa-
tion (2), which defines the partial-adjustment pro-
cess becomes  0 = r  = rit1 =  (1-Xi)(rt  - ritl) + ei.
Since ri - ri  = rit - rit. = 0, then et must equal zero
for all i and  t. Substituting  rit  =  rit into  (7)  and
solving for rt results in
ai  pi
(8)  +it  rmt
The ith asset's variance is now expressed as
(9)  Gi  = (  )2J  =bi 2
Since this last expression  is derived assuming re-
turns are in their long-run equilibrium, it is referred
to as the steady-state (i.e., long-run) variance. From
equation (9) it should be clear that long-run risk is
solely  accounted  for by  systematic  risk.  Conse-
quently,  one might  expect that the long-run mea-
sure of risk,  a2, would be less than the short-run
measure  of risk,  G2  as  diversification  and resolu-
tion of uncertainty  eliminates  nonsystematic risk.
Note,  however,  that the  terms  multiplied  by (m2
differ across  the  short  and  long-run  measures  of
risk. One cannot say unambiguously that G2 <  2,
as such a statement depends on the estimates of  .
and Pi
The long-run price-cost margin can be derived
by taking the  expectation  operator through  equa-
tion (8):
(10) E[Ir]=- a,  +  E[rm]
1-k i 1-k,
In  conjunction  with a2,  the long-run  price-cost
margin can provide insight into whether or nor par-
ticular industries have persistent price-cost margins
because of the inherent variability of such margins.
Moreover, if price-cost margins are persistent with
low risk, then scope may exist for investigation re-
lated to non-competitive behavior. However, a com-
pelling  question  asks  what  factors  influence  the
systematic  relationship  between  the  return  to  an
asset and  the market return in the  short and  long
run (i.e., Pand  b). A number of  ideas come to mind,
including limited information that forces agents to
form  expectations  in  a simplistic  manner,  credit
constraints  that limit new  capital  formation  and
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lessen persistence due to adjustment costs,  imper-
fect competition, and demand factors. These issues
are addressed  after the results of the SIM  are pre-
sented.
Data
Equation (5) is estimated using industry-level data
for 40 U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing indus-
tries.  The choice of the 40 industries is motivated
by Bhuyan and Lopez (1997), who measured mar-
ket power in 40 four-digit SIC industries in the U.S.
food and tobacco manufacturing sector using a new
empirical-industrial  organization  model.  In what
follows, results from estimation of equation (5) will
be directly related to Bhuyan  and Lopez's  results
though regression analysis.  As such, this paper fo-
cuses  only  on the  same 40 industries  as Bhuyan
and Lopez.2
Returns, r,, are measured using annual indus-
try-level price-cost margins from 1960 to 1994. Fol-
lowing Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986),
each industry's price-cost margin  (PCM)  is com-
puted as
Value of Sales + AInventories
(-  Payroll  - Cost of  Material
(11)  PCM = Value of Sales +  Inventories.
Including  the  change  in  inventories  reflects  the
notion that the value of sales may differ from the
value  of output in  any  given year  (Domowitz,
Hubbard,  and  Petersen  1986,  16).  By accounting
for the change in inventory, the value of any stored
output is reflected in the margin. Following Turvey,
Baker,  and Driver  (1988) (and a typical approach
when estimating  the SIM) the market index  rm,  is
computed  as  a share-weighted  average  of indus-
40
try-level returns-that is, rmt =  wirit -where  wt
is the industry's share of total returns to the aggre-
gate U.S.  food  and tobacco manufacturing  indus-
try.  All price-cost  margin  data are  from  the Na-
2 It should be noted that Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) omitted
the following  industries  from  their study:  frozen  fruit and
vegetables,  and juice (SIC 2037), wet corn milling (SIC 2046),
canned and cured  sea foods  (2091)  and miscellaneous  foods
(SIC  2099).  They  do so because  "The  model  [used in their
study]  either did not satisfy regularity conditions of the cost
and/or  demand functions  or was unable  to explain observed
data..." (Bhuyan  and Lopez  1987,  1038, footnote  8).
tional  Bureau of Economic  Research  web  site
(1998).
Results
Equation  5  is estimated  with Ordinary  Least
Squares  using  the SHAZAM  econometrics  pro-
gram. Assuming the errors are serially independent,
OLS has the appropriate asymptotic properties for
estimation of the partial-adjustment model. Regres-
sion results, presented in Table 1, show most equa-
tions have a good fit. Adjusted R2 values range from
about -0.004 to 0.96, with most values being greater
than 0.5.  F statistics  for each  regression  indicate
the null hypothesis  that the estimated coefficients
are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1-percent
level. Results from Durbin's m-test for first-order
auto-correlation, which are not reported to conserve
space, indicate the assumption of serially indepen-
dent errors is supported.
Fourteen of  the intercept terms are significantly
different from zero, but no discernable sign pattern
is evident.  Seventeen of the estimates of 3i are sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 1-percent-sig-
nificance  level,  11  at the 5-percent-significance
level, and one at the 10%-percent-significance  level.
Significant  estimates  of  i3  ranged  in value  from
about 0.06  in the meat packing industry to 1.18 in
the condensed and evaporated milk industry. Of the
estimated  P, values,  21  are less than  0.5,  five are
between 0.5 and unity, while three are greater than
unity.  The latter three estimates occur in the con-
densed  and evaporated  milk  (SIC 2023),  pickled
sauces  (SIC  2035),  and  flavor extract  and  syrup
industries  (SIC 2087). For these industries the ex-
pected change  in the price-cost  margin  is greater
than the change in the market index rt  in the short
run.  The large estimate of the beta coefficient  for
evaporated  milk can be  explained by  noting this
sector has experienced large growth relative to the
food  and manufacturing  sector  (see Connor  and
Schiek 1997,  157). Recall that the beta coefficient
measures  the relationship  between  returns  to  an
asset and returns to a market index. If the return to
the asset grows faster than the return to the market,
the estimated beta coefficient will be larger com-
pared to a case where the return to the asset experi-
enced slower growth. Similarly, prices in the evapo-
rated milk sector have experienced high long-term
price  increases  (Connor  and  Schiek  1997,  233),
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which  may  inflate  output prices,  and thus price-
cost margins.  Similar arguments hold for the pick-
led sauces industry.
Price-cost margin persistence in each industry
is measured by the estimate of Xi.  A total of 30 es-
timates of X.  are significantly  different from  zero.
Of these,  22 are significant  at the  1-percent  level
of significance, five at the 5-percent level, and three
at  the  10-percent-significance  level.  None  of the
estimates of X,  are greater than unity (which is ex-
pected, based on the theory of partial adjustment),
while two  estimates  are less  than zero but insig-
nificant. More than half of the estimates of Xk  range
from 0.25 to 0.75, while a number of large values
do occur. Of the significant estimates of  X,,  the larg-
est five occur in the pet food (SIC 2047), bread and
bakery (SIC 2051), soft drink (SIC 2086), ice cream
(SIC 2024)  and fluid milk (SIC  2026)  industries.
The larger the estimate of X, the slower the adjust-
ment of rt  to a change in rmt and the more persistent
the price-cost margin. Thus one may conclude that
price-cost  margins persist more in these industries
than  in other food and tobacco manufacturing  in-
dustries.  The  question becomes  why are margins
persistent?  The answer  depends  on the  industry
considered. For example, Connor and Schiek (1997,
345)  list the  pet food industry  as having  a domi-
nant firm or brand (where dominant  firm/brand  is
defined as one firm holding  10 percent or more of
the market). Thus, in the pet food industry, market
power may be at play in generating persistent price-
cost margins. In the bread and bakery industry, high
price increases over the period 1982-1992 (Connor
and Schiek  1997,  233)  likely  contribute  to price-
cost margin  persistence.  The  same  is true  for the
soft drink industry over the period 1977-1982. This
latter industry also has a high advertising-sales  ra-
tio (Connor and Schiek  1997, 362) that lends itself
to entry barriers that help  sustain  price-cost  mar-
gins. An increase  in concentration in the ice cream
and fluid milk industries  would  contribute to per-
sistent price-cost margins if such concentration led
to a less-competitive environment. Support for this
claim is evident in the dairy and milk products sec-
tor, where between  1950 and  1984 the Justice De-
partment  launched 43  cases investigating  local or
regional  market price-fixing  (Connor et al.  1985,
356 and 361).
The  smallest  significant  estimates  of Xkoccur
in  the  flavor  extract  and syrup  (SIC 2087),  veg-
etable  oil  mill  (SIC 2076), roasted  coffee  (SIC
2095),  dried  fruit and vegetable  (SIC 2034),  and
animal and marine fat (SIC 2077) industries. Since
a smaller value of ki results in a shorter adjustment
period, one may conclude that price-cost margins
in these sectors  are less persistent. Again, it must
be asked why price-cost margins are less persistent
in  these  industries.  As  an  example,  consider  the
roasted coffee  industry.  Here,  negative  growth  in
sales  between  1963  and  1972  and between  1982
and  1992  (Connor and Schiek  1997,  174) plays  a
role  if,  in response  to  falling  sales,  firms  lower
prices in order to maintain market share. Less-per-
sistent  price-cost  margins  in the  animal  and  ma-
rine  fat industry  may be  due  to the  noted reduc-
tions in price between 1977 and 1992 (Connor and
Schiek 1997,235) combined with slow growth. Per-
sistence  parameters  were  not significant  in  the
cheese,  condensed  and  evaporated  milk, pickled
sauces, rice milling, refined sugar, chocolate and co-
coa, chewing gum, cottonseed oil mil, soybean oil
mill  and tobacco  stemming  industries.  Thus  one
may conclude  that price-cost margins  do not per-
sist in these industries.
In general it may be concluded that price-cost
margins are persistent in the U.S. food and tobacco
manufacturing  industries but that no clear pattern
emerges.  Given the consolidation in the U.S. food
and tobacco manufacturing  industries, persistence
of price-cost margins  is not too  startling.  Notice,
however,  that the  meat  (3  digit  SIC  sector  201),
beverage  (3  digit SIC sector 208),  and processed
tobacco products (2 digit SIC sector 21) industries
(i.e., not including tobacco stemming) have signifi-
cantly positive estimates of the persistence param-
eter. The meat industry has a long history of being
targeted for anti-competitive behavior in the United
States.  Persistence  of margins  in the  alcohol  and
tobacco sectors is not unexpected given the poten-
tial of habit formation in consumption. In the non-
alcoholic  beverage  sector, persistence  may  also
come about from government  regulation.  For ex-
ample, the U.S. government has allowed territorial
franchises  in the bottling  and distribution  of soft
drinks (Connor  et al.  1985,  236),  thus raising  the
scope for regional  monopoly  power that contrib-
utes to persistence of margins. (Regional monopoly
power may also explain the high advertising-sales
ratio in the soft drink industry.) Consolidation has
been substantial in these sectors as well-the num-
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ber of meat packers  in the U.S. almost halved be-
tween  1963  and  1992  and,  except  for wine  and
brandy industry, the number of firms in the bever-
age sector has  fallen  precipitously.  Moreover,  in
the dairy sector (3 digit SIC sector 202), if the esti-
mate of kX  is significant,  margins tend to be  very
persistent (e.g., ice cream and fluid milk have esti-
mates of kX  greater than 0.9). Again, industry con-
solidation  and government intervention may have
contributed  to persistent margins through the use
of marketing orders and government programs that
remove products  from the market place (e.g.,  the
Women-Infants-Children  program). In the fruit and
vegetable sector (3 digit SIC sector 203) persistence
tends to be lower, while in the grain sector (3 digit
SIC sector 204) persistence varies widely. The lat-
ter two groupings have also shown a lesser degree
of concentration compared to the meat-packing or
beverage industries. The fruit and vegetable sector
also seems to be less of a target of anti-trust atten-
tion. For instance, between  1961 and 1966, the De-
partment of Justice  launched 31  cases  against the
fruit and vegetable sector, but only 16 between 1966
and  1984  (Connor  et  al.  1985,  357).  Maturity  of
the fruit and vegetable industries may be a contrib-
uting factor here  (see, for example, Sutton's  1991
discussion of the evolution of the frozen-vegetable
sector).
Focus now shifts to examining  the short- and
long-run measures of risk. Table 2 shows the sample
average  price-cost margin for each industry, esti-
mates of  ,, the transitory standard deviations and
their component shares  (i.e., the share of total risk
attributed  to  systematic  and nonsystematic  risk),
implied values of  b. with corresponding t statistics,
and the steady-state standard deviation (computed
using equation 9). Following Ben-Horin and Levy
(1980),  risk is  measured  in standard  deviations
rather  than variances,  as the  former  are  easier to
interpret.  Except  for the tobacco  stemming  (SIC
2141)  and pet food industries,  all transitory  stan-
dard deviations are less than the average price-cost
margins in the respective industries. In the pet food
industry the latter result comes about from a large
estimate of ki, which  means  1-X 2 is small,  so the
transitory standard deviation is large. In the tobacco
stemming industry this result comes about prima-
rily from a small average price-cost margin. In most
instances  nonsystematic  (i.e.,  diversifiable)  risk
accounts for the majority of total risk. Exceptions
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occur in the cheese (SIC 2022), condensed
and  evaporated  milk (SIC  2023),  canned
fruit and  vegetable  (SIC  2033),  pickled
sauces (SIC 2035), cereal preparation (SIC
2043), candy and confectionery (SIC 2065),
flavor extract and syrup (SIC 2087), roasted
coffee (SIC 2095), cigarette (SIC 2111), and
chewing and smokeless tobacco (SIC 2131)
industries,  where  systematic risk accounts
for more than half of total short-run risk.
Of the significant estimates of bi, 23 are
significant at the 1-percent level, four at the
5-percent-significance  level, and one at the
10-percent level. Most estimates of the sys-
tematic  long-run relationship  between  an
industry's  margin  and the  market margin
(i.e.,  bi) are larger  than the short-run  esti-
mates (i.e.,  Pi). For example, only three es-
timates  of Pi are greater  than unity,  while
eight  estimates of b are  greater than unity.
Furthermore,  11  estimates  of b, are greater
than 0.5 but less than unity, while only five
estimates of Pi have values between 0.5 and
unity.  These results  are expected  since,  in
the  long-run,  uncertainty  is  resolved  and
frictions preventing  adjustment  are  elimi-
nated, therefore  one would expect a  stron-
ger systematic  relationship.  However,  ex-
ceptions occur in the condensed and evapo-
rated milk, pet food, and rice milling indus-
tries, where a weaker long-run relationship
is measured-a result directly attributed to
the respective  estimates of ki for these in-
dustries.
Except for the pet food industry, steady-
state standard deviations are all less than the
average price-cost margins. In most cases,
the steady-state  standard deviation (i.e., the
long-run measure of risk) is actually lower
than the transitory  standard deviation (i.e.,
the  short-run  measure  of risk).  Instances
where  long-run  risk is less  than short-run
risk  come  about  when  elimination  of
nonsystematic risk in the long run more than
offsets  the increase  in systematic  risk that
arises through higher values of bi relative to
Pi. Exceptions include the ice cream, canned
specialties  (SIC 2032),  cereal  preparation,
pet food,  malt beverages  (SIC 2082),  soft
drink,  cigarette,  and  chewing  and smoke-
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less tobacco industries, where steady-state standard
deviations  are  larger than transitory  standard  de-
viations. In these exceptions, large values of b 1rela-
tive  to  Pi  more  than  offset the  elimination  of
nonsystematic  risk.  This is especially  relevant  in
the ice cream,  pet food, and soft drink industries,
where more than half of total short-run risk is due
to nonsystematic risk.
Table 3 again shows the sample average price-
cost margin, the expected long-run price-cost mar-
gin computed using equation (10), and the percent-
age difference between the two. In some instances,
there is little or no difference between the sample
average  and  expected  long-run  margin.  For ex-
ample, the percentage difference between E [r,] and
the sample average price-cost margin in the cheese
industry is 0.23%, although the estimate of the per-
sistence parameter for this industry is insignificant.
In most industries the expected long-run price-cost
margin is higher than the sample average price-cost
margin.  Two  extreme  examples  are  the pet  food
and bread and bakery industries. In the former, E[r 1]
is 530% higher than the sample average price-cost
margin, while  in the bakery  industry the percent-
age difference  is  16%.  In both of these industries
the persistence  parameter  X. is  extremely  large.
Note, however,  that for the condensed  and evapo-
rated milk,  fluid milk, vegetable  oil milling,  ani-
mal and marine  fat,  and  soft drink industries  the
expected  long-run  price-cost margin  is  actually
lower than the sample average price-cost margin.
The soft drink industry is rather interesting, as the
expected long-run price-cost margin is about 12%
less than the sample average price-cost margin. The
use of exclusive territories appears to have enabled
manufacturers in the soft drink industry to realize
high margins in the short run, which subsequently
fall in the long run.
As a final step in considering the long-run re-
lationship between price-cost margins and margin
risk consider Figure 1, which plots values of E[r,],
oi (the steady-state standard deviation), and a trend
line between the two series.  (Given the large val-
ues of E[r,] and  oi  in the pet food industry,  this
industry was dropped from Figure 1.) As expected,
a positive relationship exists between the long-run
price-cost margin and long-run systematic risk (as
measured by the steady-state  standard deviation).
Overall  results  suggest that within the  U.S.  food
and tobacco  manufacturing  industries  there  is  a
lower level of long-run systematic risk (compared
to the  short  run),  but that higher  long-run  price-
cost margins  compensate for risk.
Given these results, it would be prudent for an-
titrust agencies to exercise caution in investigating
industries with high price-cost margins without giv-
Figure  1.  Steady State Standard Deviation  as the Long-Run Price-Cost Margin Varies.
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Table 3. Comparison of Average  Price-Cost Margins and Expected Long-Run Price-Cost Margin.
Percent difference between
Average  Predicted long-  predicted long-run
SIC No.  Industry  PCM  run PCM  PCM and average PCM
2011  Meat Packing  0.075  0.076  1.437
2013  Saus. & Prep. Meat  0.158  0.160  1.341
2016  Poul. & Egg Prod.  0.114  0.116  1.409
2021  Creamery Butter  0.066  0.069  4.107
2022  Cheese  0.110  0.110  0.225
2023  Cond. & Evap. Milk  0.244  0.244  -0.033
2024  Ice Cream  0.243  0.252  4.054
2026  Fluid Milk  0.203  0.195  -3.797
2032  Canned Spec.  0.342  0.353  3.207
2033  Canned Fr. & Veg.  0.270  0.272  0.983
2034  Dried Fr. & Veg.  0.283  0.285  0.669
2035  Pickled Sauces  0.309  0.311  0.534
2041  Flour & Grain Mills  0.148  0.150  0.989
2043  Cereal Prep.  0.506  0.517  2.293
2044  Rice Milling  0.180  0.180  -0.144
2047  Pet Food  0.326  2.055  530.914
2048  Prepared Feed  0.164  0.170  3.355
2051  Bread & Bakery  0.410  0.479  16.785
2061  Refined Sugar  0.227  0.227  0.113
2065  Candy & Confec.  0.328  0.332  1.096
2066  Chocolate & Cocoa  0.299  0.301  0.578
2067  Chewing  Gum  0.501  0.501  0.012
2074  Cottonseed Oil Mill  0.120  0.120  0.218
2075  Soybean  Oil Mill  0.064  0.064  0.206
2076  Vegetable Oil Mill  0.107  0.107  -0.134
2077  Anim. & Marine Fat  0.210  0.209  -0.133
2079  Lard & Cooking Oil  0.169  0.171  1.175
2082  Malt Beverages  0.335  0.346  3.346
2084  Wine & Brandy Spec.  0.334  0.336  0.558
2085  Distilled Liquor  0.447  0.451  0.777
2086  Soft Drinks  0.347  0.304  -12.394
2087  Flavor Extr. & Syrup  0.558  0.559  0.335
2092  Fresh Fish Prep.  0.185  0.188  1.399
2095  Roasted Coffee  0.308  0.310  0.573
2097  Manufactured  Ice  0.394  0.396  0.447
2098  Macaroni & Spaghe.  0.351  0.358  2.052
2111  Cigarettes  0.554  0.570  2.793
2121  Cigars  0.382  0.389  1.694
2131  Chew.  & Smok. Tobc.  0.522  0.535  2.510
2141  Tobacco  Stemming  0.076  0.077  1.215
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ing due  consideration  to the  level of risk. Added
risk  in  some  industries  may be  offset by higher
margins-a lesson firmly cemented in the finance
literature.  Targeting  firms or industries merely on
the basis of the price-cost margins, and without due
regard to the level of risk or price-cost variability,
may result  in  wasteful  use of prosecutorial  re-
sources.  Recognize,  of course,  that  actions  taken
by decision-makers  and the market environments
within which actions are taken drive the empirical
results discussed above. Attention now focuses  on
how factors under the control of decision-makers,
or reflective  of market  conditions, affect the esti-
mated relationships.
Factors  Affecting  the  Systematic  Relationship
and Persistence
The  SIM  with  partial adjustment  fails to address
the question of what factors affect the values of p3,
b., and XT. To investigate this relationship,  estimates
of each  industry's  Pi, b1,  and  ki  are  regressed  on
factors under the control of decision-makers or re-
flective  of market conditions  and  industries  con-
sidered.  Such an approach  has been used in previ-
ous persistence  studies  (e.g.,  Cubbin and Geroski
1987; Geroski and Jacquemin 1988; Kambhampati
1995) and in assessing factors which influence trade
elasticities (e.g.,  Blonigen and Wilson  1999). The
regressors  include  the  industry-level  conjectural-
variation elasticity, the absolute value of the own-
price  demand  elasticity,  the  Lerner  Index of oli-
gopoly power, a measure of scale elasticity, capital
intensity,  sales-and-promotion  intensity,  R&D in-
tensity, the import intensity,  and the export inten-
sity.  Including  the conjectural-variation  elasticity
controls  for strategic  interaction  between  firms
within an industry. The absolute value of the own-
price demand elasticity accounts for differences  in
the nature  of demand,  while  interaction between
the conjectural-variation  elasticity and demand elas-
ticity is captured by including the Lerner Index of
oligopoly power. The scale-elasticity variable is in-
cluded  to reflect inter-industry  cost-structure  dif-
ferences  and  cost-based entry barriers  (e.g.,  mini-
mum efficient scale). Sale-and-promotion-intensity
and R&D-intensity  variables  are  included  to  ac-
count for product differentiation  as well as  for in-
vestment  in product  and/or process  innovation.
Capital intensity is included to account for any capi-
tal-specific entry barriers, while import and export
intensities account for the role of trade.
One would  expect  more  persistence  in  less-
competitive industries, so a positive relationship is
expected between  Xi  and  factors  contributing  to
market power.  Import  intensity is expected to re-
duce persistence by expanding the effective num-
ber of firms in the market, while export intensity is
expected  to  encourage  persistence.  Since  market
power may have  developed to cope with  system-
atic risk (i.e., risk that cannot be diversified), a posi-
tive relationship is expected between estimates  of
Pi and bi and factors contributing to market power.
Both import and export intensities  are expected to
have  a negative  relationship  with estimates  of PR
and b.,  as trade  may increase  an industry's expo-
sure to exogenous  shocks that increase  the extent
of nonsystematic  risk, thereby weakening the sys-
tematic  relationship.
Values for the conjectural-variation  elasticity,
demand elasticity, Lerner Index, and scale elastic-
ity  are  obtained  from Bhuyan  and Lopez  (1997,
1039-40), while sales-and-promotion  and R&D in-
tensities  obtained  from Connor et al. (1985,  90).
Capital intensity, which is measured as the ratio of
current-period  capital stock to real output, is com-
puted from  data available  at the NBER web site,
which  served as the source of the  SIC data. Both
the import and export intensity measures are com-
puted from data obtained from trade data available
though the National Bureau of Economic Research
(2000).
To avoid the introduction of heteroskedasticity,
estimates of Pi, b6,  and ,i are divided by the respec-
tive standard errors and then regressed on industry
characteristics  using OLS.  The second column in
Table 4  shows  results  for the regression of P, on
industry  characteristics.  While  the  adjusted R2 is
low, the null hypothesis that the estimated param-
eters are jointly equal to zero is rejected  at the  1-
percent level. Coefficients on the Lerner Index, the
demand  elasticity,  and R&D intensity are  signifi-
cantly positive,  while  coefficients  on the conjec-
tural-variation  elasticity  and  capital intensity  are
significantly  negative.  An increase  in the demand
elasticity,  oligopoly  power,  or  R&D  intensity
strengthens the systematic relationship between rmt
and the  respective  industry-level  price-cost  mar-
gin. All other things being equal, an increase in this
systematic relationship  increases  the level of sys-
CranfieldJournal  of Food Distribution  Research
tematic risk and reduces the share of risk accounted
for by nonsystematic risk. Consequently, industries
with more price-sensitive consumers,  larger mea-
sures of market power, and more R&D  activities
face  comparatively greater systematic risk, which
limits  the extent  to which risk  can be eliminated
through diversification.
However, an increase in the conjectural-varia-
tion elasticity or capital intensity  lowers the  esti-
mate  of Pi, ceteris paribus. This  means non-sys-
tematic risk accounts for a larger share of total risk
in  industries  with higher  capital  intensities  or  a
lower  conjectural-variation  elasticity.  Since  capi-
tal  intensity reflects  the  advent  and adoption  of
newer technologies,  it may be that decisions not to
adopt new or unproven technologies  (thereby low-
ering the level of capital intensity) reflects a desire
by decision makers to reduce the share of total risk
accounted  for by  idiosyncratic  risk.  It may  seem
counterintuitive  to  conclude  that  firms  reduce
diversifiable  risk by not  adopting  new technolo-
gies.  However,  such a conclusion is plausible for
technologies with unproven performance  records,
or if firms do not wish to commit capital to an un-
certain  investment.  (This is,  in  fact,  an empirical
question open  to further  research.)  The  result for
the conjectural-variation  elasticity is the opposite
to that of the Lerner index.  Remember,  however,
that the  Lemer index  reflects  the  role of the  de-
mand  elasticity.  Given  different  signs on  coeffi-
Table 4. Cross-section  regression resultsa.
P-regression  X-regression  b-regression
Constant
Conjectural  variations elasticity
Own-price demand elasticity
Lerner index
Scale elasticity
Capital intensity
Sales and promotion intensity
Research and development intensity
Import  intensity
Export intensity
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
-0.436
(-0.155)
-19.070**
(-2.115)
5.925*
(1.669)
15.179**
(2.564)
-0.994
(-0.642)
-2.689*
(-1.871)
-0.035
(-0.728)
2.609*
(1.824)
-1.580
(-0.407)
0.175
(0.064)
0.112
12.653***
12.930*
(1.847)
25.126
(1.123)
-11.781
(-1.338)
-3.891
(-0.265)
-4.297
(-1.119)
6.786*
(1.903)
0.262**
(2.226)
-10.609***
(-2.988)
-27.736***
(-2.879)
-10.861
(-1.598)
0.317
7.946***
-1.854
(-0.234)
-45.789*
(-1.812)
15.681
(1.576)
43.550**
(2.624)
-5.459
(-1.258)
-9.031**
(-2.241)
-0.065
(-0.485)
7.059*
(1.760)
-4.925
(-0.452)
2.661
(0.347)
0.173
6.140**
'**  Significant at the  1% level.
**  Significant at the 5%  level.
*  Significant at the  10%  level.
a  Values in parentheses are t-statistics.
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cients  for the  Lerner  Index  and the conjectural-
variation elasticity,  it would seem that the role of
demand  elasticities  in  shaping the  short-run  sys-
tematic  relationship  between  rit and  rmt is further
strengthened.
The third column in Table 4 shows results from
regressing h. on the industry characteristics.  While
the adjusted  R2 is also  low for this equation,  the
joint null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates
are equal to zero is rejected at the 1-percent  level.
Coefficients  on  capital  and sales-and-promotion
intensities are significantly positive, while those on
the  R&D  and  import intensities  are  significantly
negative.  Thus  industries with  higher capital  and
sales-and-promotion  intensities have more persis-
tent price-cost  margins, which suggests  these fac-
tors  may  be  important  in  forestalling  entry.  The
impact of  the sales-and-promotion  intensity on per-
sistence has been studied in the Structure-Conduct-
Performance literature, wherein advertising can be
viewed  as a means  of product differentiation that
generates product loyalty. Presumably, product loy-
alty results in consumers that are not as price  sen-
sitive,  thus  allowing firms  to  charge  persistently
higher prices. However, industries with higher R&D
and import intensities  have less persistent profits.
The negative relationship between  Xi and the R&D
intensity  may result  from R&D  activities that  re-
sult  in new  products  which cannibalize  existing
product lines, which seems plausible given that new
products  are  often developed for existing product
lines.  The  import-variable  result  is  expected,  as
trade can be viewed as a form of entry, thereby lim-
iting the extent to which existing firms can act in a
manner that results in persistent margins.
Finally,  results of the regression  of b. on the
industry characteristics  are shown in the last col-
umn of Table 4.  The adjusted R2 from this regres-
sion is  about  0.2,  while the joint null hypothesis
that the estimates  are significantly different  from
zero  is rejected at the 1-percent  level. Not only do
the coefficient  estimates  have the same sign as  in
the Pi regression, but, with one exception, the same
coefficients  are also  significant.  The exception  is
for the demand elasticity, which  is not significant
in the long-run beta-coefficient regression.  The es-
timated  coefficients  in  the  bi regression  are  also
larger,  in absolute  value, than those  in the  P, re-
gression, which reflects the long-run nature of b,.
Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to measure the per-
sistence of price-cost margins in the U.S. food and
tobacco  manufacturing  industries  while  account-
ing for the role of price-cost margin risk. To achieve
this objective,  the Single Index Model  (SIM) was
modified using  a partial-adjustment  framework.
Using four digit SIC data for 40 U.S. food and to-
bacco manufacturing industries, results suggest that
in general price-cost margins are persistent in the
U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing industries but
that no clear pattern emerges. Furthermore, the sys-
tematic  short-run  relationship between  industry-
level and market-level price-cost margins is weak.
As such, much of the short-run risk present in each
industry was attributed to nonsystematic  risk, thus
suggesting  scope  for elimination  of risk through
diversification.  Recent merger and acquisition ac-
tivity across different  food and tobacco manufac-
turing industries and other sectors of the economy
supports this argument. However, when a long-run
perspective is taken, industry-level price-cost mar-
gin risk is attributed solely to systematic risk. Most
estimates  of the  systematic  long-run relationship
between industry and market price-cost margins are
larger than the corresponding short-run  measures.
Nevertheless, long-run price-cost margin risk tends
to be  smaller  than  the corresponding  short-run
measures, reflecting the elimination of  non-system-
atic risk in the long run.
Further analysis  indicates that industries with
higher capital and sales-and-promotion  intensities
have more persistent price-cost  margins.  One im-
plication is that investment  in capital inputs,  such
as those facilitating electronic data interchange, sup-
ply-chain management systems to support efficient
consumer response, or technologies enabling value-
adding activities by food manufacturers,  may fur-
ther increase persistence of margins. Likewise, re-
placement of older capital assets may also add to
persistence,  as will activities  supporting differen-
tiation of products,  such as advertising and promo-
tion.  Results  also  show that industries  with high
R&D  and  import  intensities  have  less persistent
profits.  That increasing  import  intensity reduces
persistence makes intuitive sense. Recognize, how-
ever, that as free-trade agreements  evolve and ex-
pand,  the relative volume of imports shipped into
the U.S. may increase. If  this increase comes about
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through importation of value-added food products,
the negative relationship between imports and per-
sistence  may be exacerbated.
The  systematic relationship  between  industry
price-cost  margins  and the market  index is posi-
tively influenced by price sensitivity of consumers
(as  measured  by  demand  elasticities),  degree  of
oligopoly power, and R&D intensity, but negatively
affected by the conjectural-variations  elasticity and
capital  intensity.  Product  differentiation,  as mea-
sured through the demand elasticity, development
of  market power, and investment in product or pro-
cess innovation (as measured through R&D), also
amplifies the relationship between industry price-
cost margins and the market index. This means that
industries with price-sensitive  consumers,  market
power, and substantial R&D investment will expe-
rience larger price-costs  increases  when the mar-
ket index grows, but also larger reductions in price-
cost margins when the market index falls. As such,
these industries  also face  greater systematic  risk,
which makes it more difficult to eliminate risk via
diversification. That strategic interaction and capi-
tal investment  lowers  the systematic  relationship
between  an industry's  price-cost margin  and the
market index suggests that industries with increas-
ing concentration have potentially greater scope for
diversification.  To  see  why,  note that  increased
concentration  typically comes about through  a re-
duction in the number of firms but an increase  in
plant capacity.  Since firms left in the market inter-
act with fewer firms, the scope for strategic inter-
action  increases  (which  means  the conjectural-
variation elasticity  rises) and plant capacity must
rise (which requires additional capital investment).
In this case, a business that survives industry ratio-
nalization may  leave itself open to additional risk
related to potential  failures  (or downturns)  in the
expanded  enterprise.  Since  these  additional risks
will take the form of nonsystematic  risk, remain-
ing  firms may seek out diversification  opportuni-
ties with offsetting risks in the hopes that portfolio
effects  offer  some  measure  of protection  against
downturns  in the expanded enterprise.
The motivation for this paper was the idea that
Pareto  optimality  of a neoclassical  competitive
equilibrium has been used as justification for anti-
trust enforcement in the United States and compe-
tition policy in Canada and Europe. Results  from
this study support the notion of relaxing the assump-
tion of the neoclassical  framework.  In particular,
relaxing  the assumption  of a static,  certain  envi-
ronment  serves  to strengthen this framework  as a
tool  for antitrust  investigation  and enforcement.
Recognizing that price-cost margins exhibit a risk-
return trade-off provides antitrust  officials with  a
tool that enables them to better differentiate between
industries or firms that ought to be investigated (i.e.,
high margins with low risks) and those that ought
not to be targeted (i.e., high margins and high risks).
Presumably,  such a tool will allow for better allo-
cation of resources in the enforcement  of antitrust
and competition policy.
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